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Introduction: from homo economicus to homo behaviouralis? 
In most countries consumer protection policies have been designed and implemented on 
the basis of an explicit or implicit assumption that the average consumer is rational and 
that more information leads to better decision making, which in turn increases consumer 
welfare. This approach assumes that consumers are willing, and competent to deal with 
the information provided, to take informed rational decisions and to pursue their 
information-based rights.  For example, in rulings about unfair commercial practices (as 
defined by Directive 2005/29/EC), the European court of Justice made use of a concept of 
the average consumer that is substantially biased towards Homo Economicus (Trzaskowski, 
2011). 
A   major   shift   has   occurred   with   the   ‘behavioural   turn’   in   policy-making following the 
publication of Nudge (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008),  when  ‘many psychologists discovered that 
the  name  of  their  trade  had  changed  even  if  its  content  had  not’ (Kahneman, 2013, pp. viii-
ix).  Sunstein became Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under 
President Obama, and Thaler became an advisor to the UK Behavioural Insight Team (BIT) 
(Kahneman, 2013, p. viii). In the UK, the Institute for Government published the discussion 
paper Mindspace (Dolan et al., 2010),  drawing  heavily  on  the  ‘nudge’  philosophy.  This  was  
followed by a programme with examples of nudging in health (Behavioural Insights Team, 
2011). In 2009 the US National Institutes of Health has made the development of a 
“science  of  behaviour  change”  a  priority   (Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 2012). A report 
about the use of nudge techniques for health was published by the Centre for Strategic 
Analysis of the French government (Oullier & Sauneron, 2010).  
Understanding human decision-making is at the foundation of this approach, in which 
policy is designed to modify the choice architecture of individuals.  In other words, 
interventions are designed to modify the context in which a decision takes place without 
changing the constraints faced and thus retaining freedom of choice. This is the philosophy 
of  “libertarian  paternalism”  - by not affecting the options available in the choice set it can 
be deemed to be libertarian from a consequentialist point of view, while it is paternalistic 
in  the  sense  of  trying  to  induce  ‘better’  choices  (Thaler & Sunstein, 2003). It leverages the 
heuristics and biases that behavioural scholars have identified in their critiques of rational 
choice.  
Heuristics are mental shortcuts used for fast processing of information, which can induce 
systematic errors of judgement and create or influence gaps between planned intentions 
and realised actions. This gap is also explained with the distinction between System 1 and 
System 2 as two interacting components of the mind. System 2 follows controlled 
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processes. It is slow, effortful, conscious, rule-based and can also be employed to monitor 
the quality of the answer provided by System 1. By contrast, System 1 is automatic, 
affective and heuristic-based, it quickly proposes intuitive answers to problems as they 
arise, requires less effort and cognitive engagement, and can be triggered by 
environmental and contextual cues. Another dimension partially overlapping with the 
distinction  between  system  1  and  system  2  is  that  of  ‘hot’  and  ‘cold’  affect  and  cognition  
(Samson & Voyer, 2012; Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack et al., 2006). Hot cognition involves 
a heightened response to stimuli, one that is driven largely by emotion. In contrast, cold 
cognition refers to unemotional, painstaking thought. The typical agent of standard 
economic theory uses only system 2 and is cold and unemotionally aroused in action, 
making fully informed, controlled, and considered choices. Hence, from the behavioural 
perspective, information does not necessarily produce better decisions, since contextual 
cues affect behaviour without conscious awareness. We eat too much and unhealthily even 
if  we   plan   to   do   the   opposite;  we  want   financial   security   in   old   age   but  we   can’t   resist  
buying a new car tomorrow.  
In 2012 also the European Commission started to explore and test policy options using 
behavioural experiments (van Bavel et al., 2013). In this chapter we outline some general 
and operational considerations based on the experience we have accumulated conducting 
several experimental behavioural studies for the Directorate General Health and Consumer 
of the European Commission (EC). These experimental behavioural studies included: a) a 
first test followed by a replication to assess the effectiveness of the new Combined 
Warning (text warnings and picture) that will appear on tobacco products in Europe in 
2014 (we carried out two laboratory experiments and two online experiments; b) a 
laboratory experiment and an online experiment to test the effectiveness of CO2 labels for 
vehicles; c) a laboratory experiment and an one online experiment to test measures aimed 
at protecting consumers of online gambling services; d) a behavioural study, currently 
under  design  to  assess  the  effect  of  online  marketing  practices  such  as  ‘advergames’  and  ‘  
in-app  purchase’  on  children  aged  8-11 years old. This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 
2 we elaborate some more general and theoretical considerations that also have practical 
relevance. In Section 3, we introduce a taxonomy of nudges and of their applicability in 
different contexts. Section 4 concludes our contribution presenting practical and pragmatic 
considerations for policy related behavioural research. 
Homo Behaviouralis: not a magic bullet 
Libertarian paternalism aims at balancing the preservation of autonomy (consumer 
sovereignty) and the need to spur consumer behaviour towards a properly defined 
objective that consumers are not deemed able to meet (paternalism). The theory does not 
provide a universal criterion for the latter aim, which is an assessment that policy makers 
and courts must make. In fact, behavioural economics and the nudge movement that 
sprang from it are descriptive and empirical (Fischhoff & Eggers, 2013; Trzaskowski, 2011) 
and focus on means, not ends. Thus they do not help to draw the line between the 
legitimate influence of commercial activities and the illegal distortion of the average 
consumer’s  behaviour.   
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There is no minimal criterion to constrain nudging as a valid method of intervention that 
addresses all normative and ethical concerns, because the scientific grounding of nudging 
eliminates the possibility of its existence in the first place. By assuming preference ordering 
as exogenous, rational theory posits that a voluntary transaction performed by an agent is 
an  expression  of  his  or  her  free  will  and  can  be  ‘objectively’  deemed  as  an  improvement.  
This becomes an intellectually appealing normative criterion since, if preference ordering is 
exogenous, we can ask the following questions to evaluate two allocations A and B: if put 
in the condition, would agents perform the transactions necessary to move from A to B or 
vice versa? Since such a transaction is voluntary, it will be put in place only if someone is 
better off and the other at least not worse off. This is the Pareto criterion. Yet, the 
theoretical and empirical analysis of behavioural economists and psychologists collapses 
the  normative  edifice  with  the  implication  that  ‘we  cannot  avoid  making  value  judgements’  
(Lichtenberg, 2013, p. 497). Since choice is context dependent (Pesendorfer, 2006) in the 
sense that the choice set influences the preferences, these cannot be assumed to be 
exogenous.  Different allocations imply different preferences and thus lack of invariance of 
the criterion used to evaluate the alternatives. It would be as if in comparing two lengths 
the baseline metre changes. To give another example, dynamically inconsistent behaviour 
(e.g. addiction) is a problem of the dual self, between the preferences of morning, when 
you plan to quit smoking, and those of the evening when you buy cigarettes. Which 
preference system should be privileged?     
Our core point is that there is no magic solution.  Any form of policy intervention will 
impose a criterion   against   someone’s   will   (it   will   always   be   the   case)   and   democracy  
requires: a) transparency from the political system in terms of the values selected in 
deciding and designing an intervention; b) and at least an evidence based justification of 
choice. Overt  and  explicit  coercion  by  ‘nudgers’  is  arguably  better  than  covert  manipulation  
by those designing environmental and contextual cues. This key point is not always explicit 
and clear in the mind of the policy makers requesting a behavioural study. In this respect, 
we see the importance of combining a discovery and a selection phase in research. This 
would improve the quality of the outputs, educate policy clients, and better manage 
expectations of and decisions informed by experimental behavioural studies.  
Following Fischoff & Eggers (2013) we envisage the ideal policy supporting behavioural 
research as comprising three steps (not necessarily by the same team, nor externalized by 
the policymaker). In a study involving consumer choice X the three steps should be: 
Normative analysis. Identify, using consolidated theory and evidence, the possible 
outcomes  of  choices  X  and  decision  makers’  values  to  weight  them. 
Empirical analysis. Predict, using behavioural experiments, the choices X that consumers 
would actually make, under the conditions created by possible policies. 
Prescriptive analysis. Characterise the gap between the normative ideal and the 
descriptive reality, with each policy option. 
Evidently, to be coherent with our previous point the prescriptive implications of a gap 
between what would be normatively desirable and what is ascertained through a 
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behavioural experiment will require a value judgement on the side of the policy-makers. 
On the other hand, the empirical steps would be more effective if fully informed by the 
analysis concerning step 1 and leading to the selection of the policy options. Furthermore, 
in a phased discovery-and-selection behavioural approach there could be a dynamic feed 
back between step 1 and step 2, which would also shed more light on the final prescriptive 
assessment to be left to the judgement of the policy makers. 
Toward a better conceptualisation of nudges 
The lessons we draw from our experience with designing and delivering experimental 
behavioural studies to test policy options selected by the European Commission is that 
many situations and areas of interventions are complex and go beyond the parsimonious 
and simple nudges that have been made popular by Thaler and Sunstein. Breaking the 
impulsive flow of online gamblers requires well-articulated nudges, of which default 
settings are just one solution among many. Convincing consumers to buy eco-friendly cars 
only through nudges embedded into labels is unrealistic. Constraining the packaging 
options of cigarettes as the last channel of marketing for tobacco industry can be done 
effectively using fear appeals, leading to an emotion-driven behavioural change. This 
requires a discussion of nudging options through an attempt at a conceptual and 
theoretical systematisation.  
There are essentially two ways to address biases originating in System 1: de-biasing and 
counter-biasing (Brest, 2013; Milkman et al., 2009). De-biasing would involve complex 
strategies to activate System 2 rationality and analytical processing. Counter-biasing 
instead is playing one System 1 bias against another as in the classical simple nudges 
proposed by Thaler and Sunstein, e.g. default option leveraging status quo bias, incentives 
framed  as  losses  to  leverage  loss  aversion,  or  the  famous  ‘save  more  tomorrow’  leveraging 
hyperbolic discounting.  
There is more than that. For instance, this dichotomy neglects the possibility of activating 
System 2 by stimulating System 1 with salience and affect. Our study on tobacco labelling 
shows that eliciting strong emotions seems to have a clear impact on cognitive processing 
and on conation.  Thinking along these lines led us to formulate a preliminary taxonomy 
capturing different combinations of modes of thought and affective responses.   
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Figure 1 
In Figure 1, the two dimensions identify automatic versus reflective mode (System 1 and 
System 2) and separately the presence or absence of hot affect. In quadrant 1 we have the 
typical impulsive processing and action where the mind is at the same time in automatic 
mode and with a hot affect. This is, for instance, the case of a player fully absorbed in 
his/her gambling activity. Here one can envisage nudges that disengage by stopping the 
human-machine interaction such as a pop-up alert to be clicked and then re-engage the 
player with some mental accounting to activate System 2. In quadrant 2 we have the 
classical situation of the counter-biasing nudges (default options). The third quadrant is 
that of the fully de-biasing strategies based entirely on system 2. Finally, in the fourth 
quadrant there is the type that concerns the strategies of hitting System 1 with strong 
emotions in order to activate System 2 toward the motivation to change behaviour. The 
picture (drawing from recent developments in cognitive sociology, e.g. DiMaggio, 2002; 
Samson & Voyer, 2012; Stark, 2012) could be extended with a third dimension; the 
distinction between nudges delivered in isolation or in social context.  Advantages of such a 
taxonomic approach include synthesising and learning from experimental findings in 
different areas, and the development of a better appreciation of the characteristics of 
policy options that are, or are not, amenable to nudges of different types.  It might also 
point to avenues for research seeking to establish the mechanisms lying behind 
behavioural change.  
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Experiential challenges of designing studies for policy makers 
In our experience we have encountered four major challenges that we present here with a 
brief illustration followed by a sketch of how they could be avoided or overcome. The 
headings of the four subsections will be the proposed solutions. 
1. Include discovery and selection phases. The kind of behavioural studies requested by 
the EC involved complex policy issues with little scope for simple and straightforward 
modification  of  default  settings   that  are  often  the   focus  of   ‘nudges’.  They required more 
sophisticated and elaborated de-biasing and counter-biasing designs. Such studies would 
benefit from a discovery and exploratory phase before the selection and testing of specific 
policy options.  However, the commissioned studies were meant to test a set of alternative 
policy options that the client had framed. The conceptual and theoretical challenge we 
encountered was one where selection was pitted against discovery. Sometimes the 
proposed policy options were not informed by the extant literature and/or were not 
amenable to the nudge approach.  Equally, tight deadlines did not allow for learning within 
the study in a stop & watch approach; the opportunity to improve and change the design 
as a result of experimental learning was lost. This may create frustration and strain in the 
client-researcher relation as the former may see this new behavioural instrument as the 
magic bullet for evidence-based policy-making. Our experience suggests that the design of 
sound behavioural research in support of policy-making should include a discovery and a 
selection phase.  Exploration is about discovery and discoveries lead to new thinking.  In 
both   the   ‘selection’   and   ‘discovery’   phases   of   policy-oriented behavioural studies more 
time should be allocated to  the  development  of  a  joint  understanding  of  the  ‘problem’  and  
agreement on the goals of the study. 
2.  Convince   the   policymaker   that   sometimes   ‘less   is  more’.  The legitimate objective to 
obtain value for money may have unintended consequences.  This is evidenced in the 
lengthy shopping list of policy options that researchers are invited to test.  In the policy 
world, it may be difficult to grasp the logic of randomised control trials. As the number of 
options to be tested increases, the statistical power requirement in terms of sample sizes 
increases, as does the number of interactions. Yet on occasions, with time and budget 
constraints, we faced as many as ten or more treatments.  Even with five options a main 
factor design is inevitable, omitting the detection of interaction effects that may be of 
policy relevance. Moreover, with many options to test and little discovery phase it is also 
unclear what outcomes (response variables) would be relevant to measure from a policy 
perspective. To the extent that it is feasible from a procurement perspective, a 
consultation process should involve the client and contractors to ensure that the technical 
specification of the study is sound and to ensure that the budget offered is maximised in 
relation to the scientific validity of the output. Third party external experts might facilitate 
this process.  
3. Balance against conflicting validity pressures.  In our experience with the EC, including 
as many countries as possible is a general requirement. While this is understandable on the 
ground of maximising external validity (representativeness of the sample and apparent 
relevance to different Member States), we have found little evidence of significant country 
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effects. Unless there is a strong presumption or indication from previous studies of 
relevant country effects, a prudent selection of countries should be the normal practice.  
4. Establish a consultative client relation and involve intermediaries. Inevitably, given the 
novelty of the approach, there is some variation in knowledge and understanding of the 
logic of experimentation and insights from behavioural studies. Problems of 
communication and of managing expectations also emerged when the findings were 
presented either because of lack of familiarity with behavioural research findings or on 
account of unrealistic expectations from policy options that empirically showed minimal 
effects.  Once again, we see a role for third party experts in advisory boards to act as 
intermediaries.  
In conclusion, applied behavioural research is gathering momentum in many countries and 
across a range of policy domains.  Maintaining the momentum would be greatly helped by 
efforts to develop a common language – a basis for better mutual understanding – 
between the worlds of research and policy making. 
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